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III.
Statement of the Case

This is an appeal from the decision of the district court on review from a decision of a
hearing officer for ITD regarding an Administrative License Suspension. Please note that Trooper
Talbott, the arresting officer in this matter and the operator of the LifeLoc breath device, is the same
trooper that stopped Mr. Besaw on 21st Street in Lewiston while Mr. Beyer' s stop occurred in the
Lewiston Orchards. See Besaw v. ITD, Supreme Court Case #39759-2012. The LifeLoc is the
device used in both cases.
Party Reference

The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "State'' or "ITD" for the purposes
of this argument. Mr. Beyer is referred to by name.
Standard of Review

In Druffell v. State Department of Transportation, 136 Id. 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002), the
Supreme Court set out the standard of review in matters dealing with the judicial reviews of
administrative proceedings, the Comi stated:
"Idaho Code Section 67-5240 provides that all proceedings by an agency that
may result in the issuance of an 'order' are governed by provisions of the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA). LC. § 67-5201 et. seq.
Under the IDAPA, the ITD's decision may be overturned only where its
findings: a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; c) or made upon unlawful procedures; d) are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record; ore) are arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion. LC. Section 67-5279(3). The party attacking the
agency's decision ... must first illustrate that ITD erred in a manner specified
in I.C. Section 67-5279(3 ), and then establish that a substantial right has been
prejudiced". (cites omitted).
At p. 855. See also Idaho Transportation Department v. Van Camp, 2011WL2086512 (Id. App.)
and Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation, Docket No. 39425-2011 Idaho Supreme
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Court, June 29, 2012 Opinion.
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing
Officer that driving privileges should be reinstated because:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
(b) The peace officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(c) The test results did now show an alcohol concentration or the presence
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 188004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4 ),
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly
when the test was administered; or
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section.
The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for
judicial review. Idaho Code §67-5277.
Idaho Code §67-5279(1) sets out the scope ofreview. Bennett v. State ofldaho, Department
of Transportation, 147 Id. 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009). The Court shall not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. Upon judicial review of
an administrative hearing officer's order a Court may not set aside findings unless those findings are
"not supported by substantial evidence on the Record as a whole" Idaho Code §67-5279(3)(d).
Mahurin v. State ofldaho, Department of Transportation, 140 Id. 65, 99 P.3d 125, (2004). See also
Gibbarv. State ofldaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006).
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is: " ... if the
agency is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded for further proceedings
as necessary." Idaho Code §67-5279(3). See Gibbar at p. 1181.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Transportation Department must
be affirmed, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's
authority, is made upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Idaho Transportation Department. 13 7 Id. 33 7, 48
P .3d 666 (2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred
in a manner specified in Idaho Code §67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been
prejudiced. Gibbar v. State ofldaho, Depa1iment of Transportation, 143 Id. 93 7, 155 P.3d 1176, (Id.
App. 2006). and Idaho Transportation Department v. Van Camp, supra.
A hearing pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A results in an agency action and is therefor governed
by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. The constitutionality of a statute or administrative
regulation is a question of law over which this court exercises free review. Wanner v. State, 151 Id.
164, 244 P.3d 1250 (2011 ). At p. 1253. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act governs the review
of Department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a persons driver's
license.

See LC. §§ 49-330, 67-5270, 49-201, 67-5201(2).

Bell v. Idaho Department of

Transportation, 151Idaho659, 262 P.3d. 1030 (2011).
IV.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceeding

On November 6, 2010, George Beyer, was driving in Lewiston, Idaho, with a Class D Idaho
driver's license. R. at p. 37. The arresting officer, ISP Trooper Jeffrey Talbott, indicated in his
probable cause statement that a silver colored 2010 Chevrolet Camaro made an illegal right turn
(turned into the wrong lane) while driving southbound on Thain Road at approximately Bryden
Avenue in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, State of Idaho. R. at pp. 41-42.

The arresting officer

recorded his contact with the vehicle and the occupant by audio and video methods. Petitioner's
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Exhibit "B" DVD. R. at p. 36. On the video, the Court can note the point of time when the trooper
turned on his video, what he recorded, which would be going down Airway A venue, stopping at
Thain Road and Airway Avenue and then turning onto Thain Road following Mr. Beyer's vehicle
along several blocks, through the intersection of Burrell A venue and Thain Road to the parking lot
of the old fire house on Thain Road with Mr. Beyer turning into the parking lot and stopping. The
video also shows the initial contact with Mr. Beyer getting out the vehicle and performing the three
field sobriety tests, the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn, and one leg stand. The video will
also show Mr. Beyer being "detained". The trooper filled out a probable cause affidavit that has the
basic facts of the stop. The video shows the entire contact.
The arresting trooper noted, "Beyer performed and failed the tests." (Referring to the
standardized field sobriety tests.) R. at p. 42. Actually, Mr. Beyer did not fail "the tests." He
correctly performed the one leg stand. R. at pp. 42, 44. The trooper noted that Mr. Beyer swayed
during the one leg stand. The video does not show Mr. Beyer swaying. There was no failure of the
nystagmus onset before 45 degrees. There was no slurred speech or impaired memory. R. at p. 44.
For the walk and turn, there was no actual line for Mr. Beyer to follow. See video.
At the end of the field sobriety tests, Mr. Beyer was "detained" and not free to go. ALS T.
at p. 35. The trooper was asked the difference between "detained" and "arrested" during the ALS
hearing. He indicated that being handcuffed was the only difference. ALS T. at p. 36. Mr. Beyer
was placed in the back of the trooper's patrol car facing sideways with his feet out the door. ALS
T. at p. 36, II. 8-9. The trooper then checked his mouth for foreign material and started the 15 minute
observation period and then started the ALS audio advisory form. See video. The trooper testified
that the advisory audio is kept on his dash on his CD player. ALS T. at p. 36. The trooper had to
leave Mr. Beyer's side to start the audio in the front of his vehicle. He testified that he was standing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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two to three feet from Mr. Beyer during the 15 minute observation period. ALS T. at p. 37, II. 4-5.
At 2:48 a.m., the trooper was sitting in the front seat of his vehicle filling out the uniform citation.
There is nothing in the written record that notes when the 15 minute observation period started. The
written record notes the time of arrest was 2:38 a.m. Notice of Advisory, R. at p. 3 7. The log sheet
notes the time of the breath test at 2:57 a.m. R. at p. 40. The printout from the breath machine
shows the first air blank at 2:57 a.m. R. at p. 39. The Probable Cause Affidavit notes that Mr. Beyer
was arrested November 6, 2010, at 2:38 a.m. R. at p. 41. The uniform citation notes adate and time
as 11106/2010, 2:40 a.m. with the violation occurring at 11/06/20 I 0, at 2: 16 a.m. R. at p. 45.
The trooper testified it was approximately seven minutes into the observation period when
Mr. Beyer stated he was not going to give a breath sample. ALS T. at p. 37. The trooper testified
that he placed Mr. Beyer under "arrest" and advised him he was going to obtain a blood sample.
ALS T. at p. 37, II. 13-17. The trooper on the video told Mr. Beyer that he was going to have him
stuck with needles if he did not take a breath test. The trooper indicated that Mr. Beyer was arrested
at 2:38 a.m. ALS T. at p. 38. Mr. Beyer, while the trooper was in the front seat, decided he would
take a breath test. Mr. Beyer advised the trooper of his decision. The trooper then contacted
dispatch and told them to cancel the phlebotomist. See video. The trooper had previously requested
a tow truck driver for Mr. Beyer' s vehicle. The trooper then went back to the passenger side, had
Mr. Beyer step out and then sit in his original position with his feet outside the door with the
handcuffs still on him. The trooper then again checked Mr. Beyer's mouth for foreign material.
Note the video is now recording the backseat.
The video will show that during the 15 minute observation period, the tow truck driver
arrived and both Mr. Beyer and the trooper watched and commented on the vehicle arriving and the
maneuvering of the tow truck. The audio from the video also indicates that the trooper started
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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yelling at the tow truck driver, during the 15 minute observation period, regarding his maneuvering
and his coming towards the vehicle. There is also the traffic noise, the idling of the three vehicles
and other distractions noted on the video.
Mr. Beyer blew an insufficient at 2:57 a.m., .165 at 3:00 a.m. and .158 at 3:02 a.m. R. at p.
3 9. The breath machine used was the LifeLoc. The trooper did a performance verification using a
0.08 solution at 4:20 a.m. on November 6, 2010. R. at p. 40.
A timely ALS hearing was requested. R. at p. 49. The hearing ALS was held on December
1, 20 I 0. R. at p. 173. The hearing officer issues Subpoenas Duces Tecum for information to be
supplied by December 1, 2010, which was the day of the ALS hearing. The video tape was
subpoenaed but was not received by Counsel until after the ALS hearing. ALS T. at p. 4. Counsel
raised, at the time of the ALS hearing, an objection to not having received the video and noted,
"Sometimes the videos tell the tale as far as the stop and the field sobriety
tests and the like, or what was actually done as far as the time frames. And
not having the video puts me at a great disadvantage as far as conducting
this."
ALS Hearing T. at p. 4, II. 10-13.
The hearing officer noted also,
"As far as the DVD, it was mailed to you yesterday, to your office, and it was
prior to the time when - - the subpoena time when the law enforcement
maintained you should have it. I would entertain a stay or something in the
future after this hearing so that you can receive that and make any additional - and hold the record open for 15 days and make any additional argument that
you want to based upon review of that DVD." (emphasis added)
ALS Hearing T. at p. 6, II. 16-23.
The hearing officer indicated that he would not allow for an additional hearing, only that
Counsel would be able to make additional arguments.
A stay was entered by the hearing officer on December 2, 2012. R. at p. 129. The hearing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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officer issued his decision on December 23, 2010. R. at p. 188. The judicial review was requested.
R. at p. 5. Oral argument was heard on March 8, 2012, and the District Court issued it's decision
on April 9, 2012. R. at p. 908. This appeal followed.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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v.
Issues Presented on Appeal
A.

Did the arresting officer have legal cause to stop Mr. Beyer? I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(a)
applies.

B.

Was a 15 minute observation properly conducted? I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d) and I.C.
§ 67-5279(3)(a)(c) & (e) apply.

C.

The ALS hearing process does not allow for due process. I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a)(c)
& ( e) applies.

D.

Did the hearing officer fail to provide for due process by not having an in-person
hearing as opposed to a telephone hearing? I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a)(c) & (e) applies.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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VI.

Argument

A.
THE ARRESTING OFFICER DID NOT HAVE LEGAL
CAUSE TO STOP MR. BEYER
The Court can return to Gibbar v. State ofldaho. Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937,
155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006), for an analysis regarding legal cause for stop. I.C. § 18-8002A(7)
places the burden to present evidence affirmatively showing that the officer lacked legal cause to
stop the vehicle of the driver. Gib bar at p. 492. In Beyer, there is a video that shows Mr. Beyer's
driving pattern. There is nothing on the video that shows any law violation. Exhibit B. The
arresting officer specifically noted that there was no other law violation even though he tried to
concoct some close call regarding a white line on Thain Road. ALS T. at p. 18. See Video, Exhibit
B. The Probable Cause Affidavit only notes "an illegal right turn (turned into wrong lane) on
southbound Thain Road approximately Bryden Avenue ... " R. at p. 6. The arresting officer describes
his contact with Mr. Beyer by noting that at approximately 2:00 a.m. he was at his residence using
the bathroom and that he left his residence and drove down Airway A venue. It is interesting that the
video was on before he would have seen Mr. Beyer' s vehicle. The video is not consistent with the
trooper's live under oath testimony. ALS T. at pp. 13-20.
Please note what the Gibbar court stated:
"Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the
officer fell within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving
behavior. Atkinson, 128 Id. at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286."
At p. 943.
The trooper indicated that there was not much traffic on Thain Road and that Mr. Beyer's
entry from the parking lot onto Thain did not interfere with any flow of traffic. ALS T. at p. 17. In
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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fact, at the time of the hearing, the trooper did not even remember ifthere was any traffic on Thain.
He was certain that there was no traffic interfered with.
The trooper could not just answer the questions that were put to him, as is noted by the
following exchange:
"Question: Okay. So he didn't interfere with any flow of traffic?
Answer: The law doesn't require him to interfere with the flow of traffic.
Question: No, I am just asking. He didn't, in making this alleged maneuver,
he didn't interfere with any other traffic coming?
Answer: Not that I remember."
ALS T. at p. 17, 11. 18-25.
Mr. Beyer stated during his contact with the trooper that he did not violate the law. Video
Exhibit B. When asked under oath, Mr. Beyer stated:
"Question: Okay. And do you recollect driving into the left-hand lane of
Thain Road on November 6, 2010, or did you drive into the right-hand lane
and then maneuver over to the left-hand lane?
Answer: I took a right turn into the right-hand lane and merged into the lefthand lane.
Question: Okay. You don't recollect driving directly into the left-hand lane?
Answer: No, I do not."
ALS T. at p. 55, 11. 12-20.
As the Court in Gibbar noted, conduct which is in the normal driving behavior is not going
to be a violation oflaw. The Court can note the traffic on the video. Common sense can be applied
to the driving pattern of Mr. Beyer. The Com1 can note what is a normal driving behavior when
leaving a parking lot on a four-lane road. A driver would enter the right-hand lane and then simply

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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merge into the left-hand lane ifthere is no traffic on the roadway. The Court can note J.C. § 49-644 1
regarding turning both left and right. There was no violation of the law that allowed the trooper to
pull Mr. Beyer's car over. As a result, the Court should vacate Mr. Beyer's license suspension.
In it's decision, the District Court noted as follows, "In the instant matter, there is sufficient
evidence in the records to support the hearing officer's finding that the stop was lawful." R. at p.916.
At oral argument, the Court was doubtful as to the violation of the law based on his questioning of
Mr. Litteneker.
"The Court: How do you have to do that? Especially in the absence of
traffic, how long do you have to do that?"
Mr. Litteneker: Well, I think that Talbott would indicated based on his
testimony was that it wasn't a sufficient amount of time.
The Court: For what?
Mr. Litteneker: Do go from the inside lane if you will - - or the outside lane
into the inside lane.
The Court: How long does it have to be?
Mr. Litteneker: Whatever it was, it wasn't enough."
Oral Argument T. at p. 65, 11. 21-25, p. 66, 11. 1-7.
The Court then asked Mr. Litteneker, "What's the purpose of this rule about going from
starting in the outside line and going to the inside lane?" The Court then followed up, "It's not about

1

J.C. § 49-644 states Required position and method of turning. The driver of a vehicle intending to turn shall do so as follows
(I) Both the approach for a right turn and the right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the
roadway.
(2) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the turn in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in
the direction of travel of the vehicle. Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersection and so as to
leave the intersection or other location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction on the highway
being entered.
(3) Where a special lane for making left turns by drivers proceeding in opposite directions has been indicated by traffic-control devices:
(a) A left turn shall not be made from any other lane;
(b) A vehicle shall not be driven in the lane except when preparing for or making a left turn from or into the highway or when preparing for
or making a U-turn when otherwise permitted by law. (emphasis added)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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merging into traffic pattern on the four lane roadway?" Oral Argument T. at p. 66, 11. 10-12, 11. 1718. The Court then asked Mr. Litteneker about how much time do you have to be in the outside lane
merging into the inside in the absence of traffic. Oral Argument T. at p. 66, 1124-25, p. 67, 11. 1-2.
Mr. Litteneker did not have an answer. Mr. Litteneker did talk about the time of day and the
neighborhood of the stop, and the Court then inquired that the turn was "legal cause" at two o'clock
in the morning, but would not be a "legal cause" at some other time. Mr. Litteneker then had to
guess what Trooper Talbott would say to this question.
Traveling in the outside lane of traffic is not what is required. Making a right-hand turn only
requires that you make the turn as close as practicable to the right hand curb or edge of the roadway.
There is no requirement to actually travel in the outside line when you are entering from a parking
lot. J.C. § 49-644 just indicates that a driver must be as close to the curb when entering the street.
I.C. § 49-644 does not require someone to enter the four line roadway by traveling in the right-hand
lane for a period of time. The District Court's analysis in it's opinion does not conform with the
actual language of the statute and is incorrect. The District Court stated,
"Trooper Talbott testified he was at the intersection of Airway and Thain
when he observed a vehicle to his left preparing to turn onto Thain Road, that
he watched the vehicle as it turned and observed it go directly into the left
hand lane, in violation of LC.§ 49-644."
R. atp. 916.
Obviously, Mr. Beyer had to travel in the right-hand lane of travel before he entered the next
lane. There is no indication on this record that he did not enter the roadway as close as practicable
to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway. There was no traffic on the road that evening. When
someone is in a parking lot, driveway or the like, they need to be as close to the right-hand curb as
possible so that they do not interfere with someone who is turning into the parking lot or driveway.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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The statute's language has nothing to do with merging into the first lane of a four lane roadway. LC.
§ 49-644 has everything to do with not interfering with traffic trying to turn into the parking lot or

driveway in which in the car is turning.
Mr. Beyer did not violate I.C. § 49-642 2 involving vehicles entering the highway. He did not
interfere with any flow of traffic so there was no violation of yielding the right of way.
Mr. Beyer did not violate any provision of the Idaho Code. The hearing officer's assessment
of the record, like the District Court's assessment of the record, is incorrect. At 2: 18:31 hours, Mr.
Beyer specifically indicate that he did pull into the right hand lane. Exhibit B (video) The exchange
between the officer and Mr. Beyer is as follows:
"Police Officer: Yeah. You pulled into the outside land instead of the first
land available.
Client: I did what?
Police Officer: You know there is two lanes there. You are required to pull
into the first lane. You pulled into the outside lane.
Client: Are you kidding me?
Police Officer: You don't remember doing that?
Client: I pulled into the right."
Petitioner's Exhibit "B" DVD
The State below tried to mislead the District Court. The State argued, "Mr. Beyer does not
at that time disagree with Trooper Talbott's observation of Mr. Beyer's driving (Exhibit B at
timestamp 2:48)." State's Brief at p. 5. The actual exchange between Mr. Beyer and the police
officer was as follows:
"Client:

I didn't see what I did wrong there but I guess I did something

2

LC § 49-642 states Vehicle entering highway The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from any place other
than another highway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered or crossed.
13
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wrong.
Police Officer: When you made the right-hand tum you got to tum into the
first lane available.
Client: I thought I did."
Petitioner's Exhibit "B" DVD
On the video, Mr. Beyer twice denied that he failed to obey the law. The State quotes
Trooper Talbott as saying "As Mr. Beyer turned right into Thain, he did not pull into the right-hand
lane. He pulled directly into the farther or left-hand lane." State's Brief at p. 5, footnote 2. This
entry onto Thain Road would be impossible. Mr. Beyer had to pulled into the right-hand lane to get
into the left-hand lane. The State notes as follows:
"The hearing officer determined that Mr. Beyer' s testimony did not outweigh
the live testimony and sworn statement of Trooper Talbott in finding that Mr.
Beyer did not meet his burden (R.P. 156 Findings 1.-6 and 7 1.7)."
Brief at p. 5
Obviously the State below believed that the credibility of the witnesses was at issue. Mr.
Beyer testified at the hearing, "I took a right-hand tum into the right-hand lane and merged into the
left-hand lane." ALS T. at p. 55, ll 16-17. He was then asked ifhe recollected driving directly into
the left-hand lane and he said "No I do not." Mr. Beyer's under oath testimony matches the
statements he gave to the trooper at the time of the stop as noted on the video. The trooper's
testimony is suspect.
In this case there is no bad driving on the video. Mr. Beyer' s vehicle was traveling the right
speed, had his lights on, drove in his lane, proceeded through an intersection, made a proper
maneuver into the right-hand lane and into the parking lot, and made an appropriate stop.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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The hearing officer found as follows, "Beyer testified; 1) drove into the right-hand lane and
then merged into the left-lane of travel." Findings and Conclusions of Law and Order at p. 3; R. at.
154. The hearing officer then indicated that Beyer' s testimony is given the same weight as given to

Trooper Talbott's live testimony and sworn statement. The hearing officer also found because
Beyer' s testimony and Trooper Talbott' s live testimony and sworn statement are equally
contradictive, as required by Idaho Code, Beyer must prove evidence to support his position.
The hearing officer stated that Beyer' s testimony alone in this case does not outweigh
Trooper Talbott's live testimony or sworn statement. R. at p. 156. The sworn statement notes as
follow: "On November 6th, 2010, approximately 0216 hours, I, Trooper Jeffrey R. Talbott, stopped
a silver, 2010 Chevrolet Camaro (Idaho registration N 110561) for illegal right-tum (turned into
vvrong lane) on southbound Thain Road approximately Bryden Avenue., ... " R. at p. 6. Mr. Beyer
did not turn into the wrong lane.
The hearing officer and the District Court make the same mistake in interpreting the language
of LC.§ 49-644. LC. § 49-644(1) requires that the approach for a right-hand turn and the right-tum
be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the highway, this is exactly what
Mr. Beyer did. There is no indication that he failed to stop in the parking lot close to the right-hand
curb before he entered the road.
There is no obligation for a driver to drive into the right-hand lane for any length before they
go from the right-hand lane to the left-hand lane of a four lane road. A driver simply has to stop near
the curb and turn into the road way. There is nothing in this record that indicates that Mr. Beyer
violated LC. § 49-644(1). The Court can interpret the statute by reading the plain language that is
used. There is no indication that Mr. Beyer at the point of his stopping in the parking lot in
preparation to enter Thain Road was not as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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highway when he entered Thain. Mr. Beyer testified under oath that he made a proper turn. Based
on the totality of the circumstances and the failure to properly interpret I.C. § 49-644(1), there was
not a proper legal cause for a stop.
B.

A 15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD WAS
NOT PROPERLY CONDUCTED
The District Court in it's decision noted as follows,
"When the tow truck driver got out of his truck, the trooper merely yelled for
him to not to 'grab' Petitioner's vehicle yet, which took less than ten
seconds."
R.atp.918.
The District Court specifically found that the trooper was distracted from Mr. Beyer.
However, the District Court then goes on to write, "Petitioner offered no evidence that Trooper
Talbott was distracted during the observation period." R. at p. 919.
There has to be a 15 minute observation period prior to breath testing. See State v. Stump,
146 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). The Stump case points to the specific standard of observation
required. See also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d, 761 (Ct.
App. 2009).
In Stump, the driver was transpo1ied to the Teton County Sheriffs office to test his breath
alcohol using an Intoxilyzer 5000. The arresting officer was in the same room with Mr. Stump. The
Court noted that there was no evidence in the record of any circumstances or conditions inside the
room which might have interfered with or impaired the arresting officer's senses. Officer Hurt also
advised Mr. Stump to tell him if he had belched or regurgitated during the 15 minute wait.
In Beyer, the arresting officer did not tell Mr. Beyer that he needed to advise the officer if
he actually belched, burped, or the like. In Wilkinson v. ITD, 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d. 680 (Ct.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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App. 2011), the Court in footnote 4 discussed the issue of being instructed not to belch:
"Although the officer did not do so in this case, it would enhance law
enforcement procedures to simply ask the suspect if she belched, burped,
vomited, or did anything else during the waiting period that might skew the
test results. Previous cases have taken note of whether or not the officer
addressed such type of question to a subject. See e.g. Stump, 146 Idaho at
861, 203 P.3d at 1260; Carson, 133 Idaho at 452, 988 P.2d at 226."
At. p. 684.
In the Wilkinson case, the question of observation was before the Court. The Court of
Appeals ruled against the driver, however, the Wilkinson test took place in a concrete room designed
for breath testing. There were three video cameras capturing the events as they occurred. The
hearing officer viewed these recordings before making his decision. In addition, there was another
female officer in the room standing directly behind Wilkinson during the period of time Officer
Davis had his back turned to Wilkinson. Wilkinson under scores the problems that are found in Mr.
Beyer's case regarding the observation period. Trooper Talbott did not ask Mr. Beyer ifhe burped,
belched, or the like before breath testing began. The trooper did not videotape the events as was
found in the Wilkinson case, he could have but specifically choose not to.
Mr. Beyer was sitting in the back seat of the police car with the door open and the officer
standing outside. There were two observation periods. The initial period in which the advisory was
played with Mr. Beyer un-handcuffed and his bottom in the backseat of the police vehicle with his
feet sticking outside the vehicle. Mr. Beyer refused the breath test at that time. The trooper then
started telling Mr. Beyer that he was going to get his blood drawn and be stuck with needles. The
trooper got in to the front seat of his vehicle and started the process of entering the uniform citation.
ALS T. at p. 39-40.
The trooper indicated that he was standing within two to three feet from Mr. Beyer during
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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the observation period. ALS T. at p. 17, 11. 4-5. Mr. Beyer then indicated he would take the breath
test, but now he was handcuffed with his bottom still in the backseat of the vehicle and his feet
outside the door. Another mouth check was done and another 15 minute observation period was
started using the officer's wristwatch. ALS T. at pp. 40-41. The trooper made no written notation
of the time when the 15 minute wait started.
The arresting officer was distracted by outside influences. Mr. Beyer was sitting in the back
of an ISP vehicle in a parking lot next to one of the busiest streets in Lewiston. The Court can note
the traffic on the street. There is no indication as to where the Lifeloc was that the trooper retrieved,
whether he had it on him or had to get it from his vehicle.
The Court noted in State v. Defranco, 143 Idaho. 335, 338, 144 P.3d. 40, 43 (Ct. App. 2006)
that the 15 minute monitoring period is not an odorous burden and will be met if the officer stays
in close physical proximity to the test subject so the officer's senses of sight, smell, and hearing can
be employed.
In State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, (Ct. App. 1999), the Court was faced with a 15 minute
wait that occurred in a law enforcement vehicle while the driver was being transported to the
Washington County Sheriffs Office to use the Intoxilyzer 5000. In that case, Mr. Carson was asked
if he had belched or vomited or burped, etc. during the drive. The arresting officer said he
intermittently observed Mr. Carson in the rearview mirror and listened for any indication of belching
or regurgitation. The arresting officer testified that because of the late hour he encountered no traffic
on the road and his police radio was quiet throughout the trip. The officer then acknowledged during
cross examination that is was raining and that the windshield wipers were operating. The Court
found that the arresting officer's attention was not devoted to Mr. Carlson and that evidence
presented at the motion hearing and common sense, tells us that an officer's ability to use his hearing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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as a substitute for visual observation was impeded by noise with the automobile engine, tires on the
road, rain and windshield wipers.
In State v. Defranco, supra, a similar situation to Mr. Beyer's case is presented. The
instrument used was the AlcoSensor III. In Defranco, the officer left the patrol car's rear door open
and entered through the front passenger door, called dispatch momentarily and removed his
AlcoSensor equipment that had been on the front seat. He then walked to the rear of the vehicle,
opened the trunk and looked through a file box to find a advisory form. The Court found that the
observation period was not possible based on these circumstances.
The Court noted that, as in Carson, the officer was not always in a physical position to either
use his sight or alternatively his senses of smell or hearing to accomplish the purpose of the
monitoring period.
Trooper Talbott' s attention was distracted from Mr. Beyer while he yelled at the tow truck
driver. During the 15 minute wait, Trooper Talbott's attention and senses were not on Mr. Beyer.
Even the District Court thought the trooper was distracted for less than ten seconds because of him
yelling at the tow truck driver. R. at p. 918. "If an officer deviates from that practice, without
beginning the fifteen minute period anew, which is always an alternative in cases of uncertainty, the
officer risks that the breath test results will be rendered inadmissible. Such is the result here."
Defranco. supra, At p. 338.
None of the case law cited herein requires that the Driver prove that he burped, etc, the Driver
only has to prove that the 15 minute observation period was not followed. The case law is very clear.
There were separate distracting incidents during the 15 minute observation period. It is very
clear that the appellate courts do not have much patience for the lack of the 15 minute observation
period if its conducted outside or in a vehicle.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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In Mr. Beyer' s case, there is the radio traffic from dispatch during the 15 minute wait.
There is no evidence in this case, like in Carson, that some other senses replaced the senses of sight
or hearing. There is no indication that a person standing outside a vehicle, with someone sitting
inside a vehicle, could smell anything such as a burp or the like. The trooper said he was two to
three feet away from Mr. Beyer. Obviously, the senses of touch and taste do not apply. ALS T. at
p. 37, 11. 4-5. The three senses that were applicable in this case were distracted or not realistically
available during parts of the 15 minute observation.
The State will argue that Mr. Beyer simply wants the court to replace it's judgment for the
judgment of the hearing officer. One would have to assume that is what the State argued in the other
cases dealing with the 15 minute observation period such as: State v. Stump, 14 Id. 857 (Ct. App.
2009), State v. Carson, 133 Id. 451 (Ct. App. 1999), and State v. Defranco, 143 Id. 335, 144 P.3d
40 (Ct. App. 2006). The State may argue the following:
"The sufficiency of the waiting period isn't as essential as it may have been
when the Idaho Appellate Court was deciding State v. Carson, 133 Idaho
451, 988P.2d225 (Ct.App.1999)orStatev. DeFranco, 143Jdaho335, 144
P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2006). It is comparing apples and oranges to suggest that
the same analysis of the operating and training manuals then existing and the
Standard Operating Procedures as they exist now, produces the same results
as the early breath testing cases."
Besaw Brief at p. 12. Nez Perce County Case Number CV 2011-00364, Supreme Court Case
#39759-2012
The State makes this argument but does not explain exactly how this is true. Has the
equipment changed? Has the manufacturers' recommendations changed? Has the science changed?
Has Henry's law, the scientific foundation for breath testing, changed? The only thing that has
changed is ISP Forensic Services' decision to make "standards" discretionary. However, there is no
change regarding the mandatory 15 minute waiting period as the SOP requires. "Proper testing
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procedure by certified Operators is necessary in order to provide accurate results." R. at p. 346.
The current SOP requires "at least 15 minutes of observation" R. at p. 346. The Court has
to wonder whether "should" really is discretionary when the SOP states as follows: "Any material
which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the month prior to the start of the
15 minute waiting period." (emphasis added) R. at p. 346. If Mr. Beyer had an apple in his mouth
or a chew soaked with alcohol or a lemon or 12 marbles, does the officer have discretion to allow
that material to remain in the mouth during the wait period and during the blow.
What about the following, "During the monitoring period the subject/individual should not
be allowed to smoke, drink, eat or belch/burp/vomit/regurgitate." Rat. p. 346. Again, if Mr. Beyer
was smoking, drinking, eating, burping, vomiting and regurgitating, could the breath samples be
valid because the word "should" is used in the SOP? Prior examples of the procedure of the 15
minute wait are as follows:
"Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject must be monitored for
fifteen (15) minutes. During this time the subject may not smoke, drink, or
chew gum, candy, food, or any tobacco product. A material which
absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth prior to
the start of the fifteen minute waiting period."
SOP 11/2006 Paragraph 3.1. See Wheeler at p. 768.
It is clear that this language including the "may not" and the "should" are all mandatory

requirements. If they are not, then someone could smoke and drink during the 15 minute wait, and
it would not have an effect on the breath test.
The audio of the contact with Mr. Beyer speaks for itself. The District Court ignores the facts
that the trooper was distracted from Mr. Beyer with the dispatch radio, the idling of the three
vehicles, the trooper watching the tow truck arrive and then yelling at the driver. In the cases cited
above, there is no testimony from the drivers about burping, vomiting, regurgitating or the like and
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still the courts found a violation of the observation period. Mr. Beyer does not have to provide
testimony regarding burping.
On August 20th, 2010, a revised SOP was put into use and then seven (7) days later, there
were numerous deletions and additions noted on the August 27th, 2010, SOP. The current SOP was
put into place on November 151, 2010. R. at p. 50, SOP at p. 5 of 21.
The hearing officer states as follows:
"Even when Trooper Talbott's attention was diverted to other situations
during the monitoring period (including Trooper Talbott yelling to a tow
truck driver for less than 8 seconds,) Exhibit Band additionally Beyer failed
to provide any proof that Trooper Talbott's other senses than sight were
unable to assist in monitoring Beyer."
R. atp. 159.
A U.S. Supreme Court decision, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 at 125, 120 Sup. Ct. 673
(2000), applies common sense to judgments and inferences from human behavior. Common sense

and human nature can be applied to Trooper Talbott' s actions. Human nature would not find, neither
would common sense, that if Trooper Talbott was yelling at the tow truck driver that any of his
senses were directed towards Mr. Beyer. His senses would have been directed to the guy he was
yelling at. His sight and his hearing would have been directed at the tow truck driver. His senses
of touch and taste are not relevant in this circumstance. His sense of smell is not helpful since he
was two to three feet away from Mr. Beyer. R. at p. 154. There is no indication he was bending
over, facing Mr. Beyer. The Court has to use common sense and note that not every belch and burp
is going to heard, and not every belch or burp is going to give out an odor. What exact odor would
the belch or burp be? We already know, based on this record, that Mr. Beyer smelled of alcohol,
would not his belch or burp most likely smell like alcohol? The sense of smell in this particular case
is not really of any help. Again, common sense and human nature would lead one to believe when
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you are yelling at someone that most likely your sense of smell is not directed towards someone
sitting in the back seat of a vehicle. Please note that the affidavit signed off by the trooper noted, "I
could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle." R. at p. 6. The DUI
NOTES of the affidavit indicates, "Odor of an alcohol beverage: Yes." R. at p. 6.
The hearing officer made a determination that Mr. Beyer exhibited the following behaviors,
"Smell of an alcoholic beverage." R. at p. 156. The hearing officer made a determination that the
officer was two to three feet from Mr. Beyer. R. at p. 154.

The other circumstances of being

outside on a street like Thain Road, along with the other distractions, support Mr. Beyer's position
that the hearing officer ignored the facts and the case law supporting Mr. Beyer's position.
The tow truck does not arrive until 02:55 :26 hours. It is clear from the audio, that just prior
to the trooper yelling at the tow truck, he is moving from his location next to Mr. Beyer. You can
hear the gravel underneath his feet. The trooper obviously was moving toward the tow truck driver
to yell at him prior to the breath testing.
There was not a proper 15 minute observation period, therefore the breath test is not valid.

c.
THERE IS NO DUE PROCESS IN ALS HEARINGS
The Court can use the Bell v. ITD, 151 Idaho 659, 262 P .3d. 1030 (2011) and Gib bar v. State
ofldaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006), decisions in
its analysis of due process in these ALS hearings. In Bell, the Court found the actions of the hearing
officer troubling because there seemed to be a disregard for Bell's substantial interest in receiving
a decision before, or at least, promptly after the deprivation of his license. At p. 1042. ALS hearing
officers can not make decisions regarding constitutional challenges to Idaho Statutes. See IDAPA
Rule 04.11.01.415. R. atp. 300.
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In Mr. Beyer' s case, the hearing officer issued subpoenas for evidence to be produced the day
of the hearing. The Court of Appeals in the Bell case, did not think this was a very good practice.
The Court can expand on the Bell decision and find that ITD' s practices are not conducive with any
form of due process. The subpoenas in Beyer, which require items to be produced by December 1,
2010, were Exhibits 16 and 17. R. at p. 33-34. In this case, Counsel for Mr. Beyer raised the issue
oflack of the subpoenaed information. ALS T. at p. 4. Counsel for Mr. Beyer was wrong about Mr.
Beyer not being prejudiced simply because a stay was entered. The hearing officer's decision was
entered December 23, 2010. R. at p.188. A stay was entered on December 2, 2010. R. at p. 184.
Not having the video was prejudicial to Mr. Beyer's due process rights. The written affidavit set out
minimal facts, and Mr. Beyer did not have a fair opportunity to examine the arresting trooper without
access to the video prior to the hearing.
There is no specific mechanism which allows for the driver to have a second hearing after
wrongly withheld information is received. A Motion for Reconsideration can be filed, but what good
does that do in a situation like this when the hearing officer has already denied a Motion for inperson hearing. R. at p. 72. In-person hearings have not been granted since the 1990s at which time
Mr. Litteneker, Mr. Kovis, and Mr. Givens were all local hearing officers having local hearings. The
Court can go back to the Gib bar case and note the information that was provided to the Gibbar court
regarding the statistics for in-person hearings versus telephone hearings. Gibbar at p. 949. The
Gibbar Court stated:
"While it may be true that some petitioners in ALS hearings may experience
unreasonable and prejudicial delays under the system, there is no evidence of
such circumstance before us but only counsel's unsubstantiated assertions."
At p. 950.
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Attached to the brief filed below with the District Court and marked Exhibit "C" were copies
of subpoenas that have been issued in other ALS hearings. R. at p. 4 76. Please note the date of the
hearing and the dates on the subpoenas. Attached to the brief filed below with the District Court and
marked Exhibit "D" were numerous hearing officer decisions in which license suspensions were
vacated, some were sustained, but all the decision were not reached within any sort of timely manner.

R. at p. 484. Some decisions are days late, some are months late. ALS hearing decisions and actual
subpoenas provide proof of the due process problems and are not merely "unsubstantiated
assertions".
The Bell Court in a footnote stated,
"If delays of this magnitude occurred in a case where the driver ultimately
prevailed, the driver would have suffered an irremediable and unacceptable
lost of driving privileges for over three quarters of the minimum suspension
term described by I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a) before issuance of a decision
overturning the suspension."

At p. 1042.
The driver's counsel in Bell and in In Re Gibbar, 143 Id 937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App.)
(2006), tried to inform the Court of the immense burdens faced by drivers. These burdens range
from subpoenas not being issued, no discovery being supplied and hearing decisions not being issued
in a timely manner to protect any due process rights.
The appellate courts are not aware of the magnitude of the problems faced by drivers in ALS
proceedings. Every attorney who does ALS matters could turn over a mountain of decisions in
which ALS decisions were not reached in any sort of timely due process manner.
It is well established that the suspension of an issued motor vehicle operator's license
involves State action that adjudicates important property interest of the licence. In such cases, the
licenses or driving privileges are not to be taken without the procedural due process rights required
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by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723,
52 L.Ed.2d, 152 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 931S.Ct.1586, 29 L.Ed.2d, 90 (1971) and
Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 103 S.Ct. 3513, 77 L.Ed.2d, 12, 66 (1983). The Idaho
Constitution provides additional due process protection.
The Court is aware the administrative license suspension scheme deprives Mr. Beyer of his
driver's privileges which is a valuable right recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court. See State v.
Ankney, 109 Id. 1, 704 P.2d 333, (1985) and State v. Kouni, 58 Id. 493, 76 P.2d 917, (1938).
The Court should focus on Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 4 7 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976) in determining whether an administrative proceeding satisfies due process. Matthews sets
out three factors to determine due process rights in administrative proceedings. The first factor deals
with the private interest that would be effected by the official action. The second involves the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. The final factor involves the government's
interest including the function involved in the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedure would entail. See Bell, supra.
The Court may want to look at Whitesides v. Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor
Vehicles, 20 P.3d 11, 20 Alaska (2001 ). This case deals with a refusal and whether licensed drivers
are entitled to in person hearings before a hearing officer concerning the revocation of their license
and whether a telephone hearing satisfies due process. In that case, the Alaska Supreme Court held
the witness credibility is material and an in-person hearing was required. The Alaska court cited Bell
v. Burson, supra. The Court then cited a California court which noted the practical importance of
a driver's license in today's travel orientated society. The California court went on to comment in
a contemporary society public transportation may not meet the needs of many travelers and that
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transportation such as taxi cabs are not economically feasible for a large portion of the population.
The Court In The Matter of Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 167; 911 P.2d 754 (1996), stated,
"Procedural due process requires that a party be provided at an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner". See also Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 785 P.2d 163
(1989). In Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P.724 (1922), the Supreme Court stated:
"Due process of law is not necessarily satisfied by any process which the
legislature may by law provide, but by such process only as safeguards and
protects the fundamental, constitutional rights of the citizen."
At p. 546.
Substantial due process requires that state action which deprives a person of life, liberty or
property have some rational basis, that is, the reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate
that the judiciary will characterize is as arbitrary. Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 726 P.2d 693
(1986).
The standard applicable in due process cases is whether the challenged law bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. In State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 911 P .2d. 742 (Ct.
App. 1995), the Court set out the Matthews test for determining whether State action violates due
process. The Matthews v. Eldridge case is cited in many decisions in the State ofldaho. The Court
can noted Lu Ranching Company v. US, 67 P.3d 85 (2003) and Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Counsel,
136 Idaho 63, 28 P.3d 10, 06 (2001 ). In Bradbury the Court stated:
"To determine whether an individual's due process rights under the 14th
Amendment had been violated, courts must engage in a two step process.
The court must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a
liberty or property interest under the 14th Amendment. (cites omitted). Only
after the court finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of
analysis in which it determines what process is due (cites omitted)".
At pp. 72 - 73.
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In Bell, supra, there were several continuations. The Court stated;
"Because no such objection was made, the hearing officer had no occasion
to present any justification for the delay or explanation of how it may have
served a governmental interest.
Although Bell's repeated requests for irrelevant discovery contributed
somewhat to the hearing postponements, the delays involved here are
troubling to this Court. The actions of the hearing officer evidence little
regard for Bell's substantial interests in receiving a decision before, or at least
promptly after. the deprivation of his license." (emphasis added)
At p. 1042.
Mr. Beyer's Counsel did raise an objection about the lack of the video. ALS T. at p. 4.
In State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 267 P.3d. 729 (Ct. App. 2011), the Court of Appeals
stated,
"It is fundamental to our legal system that the state shall not deprive 'any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' U.S.
Constitution, Amendment Fourteenth, Section One. It is a two step process
to determine due process rights: first, deciding whether a government
decision would deprive an individual of a liberty or property interest within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause; and second,
if a liberty or property interest is implicated, a balancing test must be applied
to determine what process is due. State v. Rogers 144 Id. 738, 740, 170 P.3d
881, 8 83 (2007)."
At p. 734.
The Court can also review the change of the ID APA rules. The ID APA rules no longer
require the thirty day period to get a hearing decision issued. The Court in Bell v. ITD, (2011),

supra, noted that the provision from IDAPA Section 39.02.72.600.01 has been removed. However,
I. C. § 18-8002A requires that a hearing be held within twenty days, and if not within twenty days,

then within ten days for good cause shown. The Bell court determined that this scheme allows at
least three days for the hearing officer to render the decision before a suspension takes effect. The
hearing officers are not concerned about due process. ITD has no concern about due process. Why
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change the IDAP A rule as noted by the Bell court? There is no discovery allowed, no timely
subpoenas and decisions. There is no due process in these ALS hearings.
Now with the Johnson v. ITD, 2012 WL 1949853, decision, there is no reason for hearing
officers to issue timely decisions. The drivers have no opportunity to seek out court assistance with
a stay because no ALS decision has been reached.
The State in it's argument below indicated that Mr. Beyer made a general request for an inperson administrative hearing without any authority for the request. LC. § l 8-8002A indicates that
"administrative hearing" means a hearing conducted by the hearing officer to determine whether a
suspension imposed by the provision of this section should be vacated or sustained. The hearing
request is described by the statute as being a request for administrative hearing on the suspension
imposed by the provision of this section.

The hearing officer has the ability to conduct

administrative hearings and shall the authority to administer oaths, examine witnesses and take
testimony, receive relevant evidence, issue subpoenas, regulate the course and conduct of the
hearing, and make a final ruling on the issues before him.
The advisory that was read to Mr. Beyer stated as follows:
"You have a right to an administrative hearing on the suspension for the
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT to show cause why you
failed the evidentiary test and why your driver's license should not be
suspended. A request must be made in writing and will be received by the
department within seven (7) calendar days ... "

R. at p. 1.
Mr. Beyer had every right to ask for an in-person hearing. It is easy for the State to argue that
an in-person would not have had any effect on this case and argues that Mr. Beyer was able to
thorough and vigorously examine Trooper Talbott without objection. How exactly can a thorough
exam of the trooper occur when the examiner does not have a major piece of evidence, like the
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video, which was rightly requested but wrongly withheld.
The hearing officer took judicial notice ofIDAPA Rule 04.11.01.552 which indicates that
hearings may be held in-person or by telephone. R. at p. 231. Mr. Beyer does have authority to
request in-person hearings. The hearing officer ignored the rules that are set out in IDAPA Rule
04.11.01.
The Department continues to thumb it's nose at due process despite the Bell decision.
Attached and marked Exhibit "E" to the brief to the District Court below are a Notice of Hearing and
Subpoenas Duces Tecum for an administrative hearing regarding a breath test in which the hearing
was scheduled for February l 61\ 2012. The subpoenaed information was to be provided five (5)
days after the hearing on February 21st, 2012. R. at pp. 890-891. ITD continues to carry on the

practice the Bell court condemned. Why?
D.
THE HEARING OFFICER FAIL TO PROVIDE FOR DUE PROCESS
BY NOT HAVING AN IN-PERSON HEARING

Mr. Beyer requested an in-person hearing for his administrative hearing. R. at p. 51. The
hearing officer denied the request for in-person hearing pursuant to an Order signed November 18,
2010. R. at p. 72. Mr. Beyer was issued a license suspension on November 6, 2010. R. at p. 37.
He requested a hearing on November 12, 2010. R. at p. 49. The hearing was scheduled for
December 1, 2010. R. at p. 173. Subpoenas were issued for the attendance of the arresting officer.
R. at p. 68. Subpoenas Duces Tecum were issued for the audio/video and the certificate of approval
for the Lifeloc device. R. at pp. 69-70. The subpoenaed material had to be received by December
1, 2010. At no time prior to December 1, 2010, did Counsel for Mr. Beyer receive the audio/video.
ALS T. at p. 4.
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The hearing officer, during the hearing, stated:
"Also, as for the DVD, it was mailed to you yesterday, to your office, and it
was prior to the time when - - the subpoena time when the law enforcement
maintains you should have it. I would entertain a stay or something in the
future after this hearing so that you can receive that and make additional - and hold the record open for the fifteen days and make any additional
arguments that you want to based upon review of that DVD."
ALS T. at p. 6, 11. 16-23.
On December 7, 2010, Counsel filed a Motion to Strike Breath Test with the hearing officer.
R. at p. 165. In that Motion to Strike Breath Test, Counsel went over the case law dealing with
observation periods outside closed rooms and cited to State v. Defranco, 143 Id. 355, 338, 144 P.3d
40, 43 (Ct. App. 2006) and State v. Carson, 133 Id. 451 (Ct. App. 1999). Those cases dealt with
fifteen minute observation period. Counsel described in this motion the distractions involved with
Mr. Beyer and the arresting officer. The Court can note the Probable Cause Affidavit that was filed
in this case which leaves out a great deal of information regarding the contact with Mr. Beyer. R.
atp.41.
Counsel for Mr. Beyer called into question the credibility of the witnesses. R. at p. 169. The
video shows that the camera was on before the alleged bad driving. The video shows the trooper
driving down Airway Avenue prior to his stop at Thain Road. There are buildings on the left
blocking the view of the bar parking lot and Thain Road. ALS T. at pp. 14-15.
Mr. Beyer was asked on the video a couple of different times about the stop. Mr. Beyer
denied violating the law by driving into the improper lane. There is no indication on the video of
any bad driving. The officer testified that the video starts thirty seconds before the violation that he
witnessed. ALS T. at p. 19. Why was the camera started before he could even see Mr. Beyer and
his vehicle?
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

31

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

The trooper made comments to Mr. Beyer about "being stuck with a needle" for a blood
draw. These comments were made in a threatening fashion based upon the tone of the trooper. The
Court can use these comments to determine the type of trooper the Court is dealing with.
The issue of in-person hearings has been raised previously in Gibbar v. State, 143 Id. 937,
155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). In Gibbar, due process violation arguments were made in part
because of a lack of an in-person hearing. Counsel for Mr. Gib bar cited the Court to Alaska cases.
Gibbar at p. 494. The Gibbar court, however, looked at a New Mexico case, State Ex Rail Human
Services Dept. v. Gomez, 99 NM 261, 657 P.2d 1172, (1982) and commented on the issue of
credibility of the witnesses:
"The New Mexico Court concluded that the telephone hearing did not
deprive the beneficiary of due process because his credibility was not an issue
likewise, Gibbar did not contest the other witness's version of the underlying
events. We conclude that the telephone hearing posed no risk of erroneous
deprivation ofGibbar's driver's license because credibility was not an issue.
See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 Sup. Ct. at 903, 47 L. Ed.2d at 33-34.
Therefore, Gibbar's due process rights were not violated when he was only
allowed to cross examine witnesses over the telephone."
Gibbar at p. 494.
In Mr. Beyer's case, the hearing officer specifically commented on credibility issues and
noted that Mr. Beyer bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. R. at p. 192.
The hearing officer also noted that Mr. Beyer's testimony was given the same weight as given the
trooper Talbott's live testimony and sworn statement. R. at p. 192. The hearing officer stated:
"Because Beyer' s testimony and Trooper Talbott' s live testimony and sworn
statement are equally contradictive, as required by Idaho Code, Beyer must
provide evidence to support his position. Beyer' s testimony alone in this case
does not outweigh Trooper Talbott's live testimony or sworn statement."
R. at p. 192.
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The District Court in it's opinion states as follows,
" ... Petitioner contends he was prejudiced by not having an opportunity before
the hearing to review the video, which also deprived him the opportunity to
examine the Trooper regarding the video. Petitioner concedes he did not file
a motion for reconsideration but argues it would have been no benefit without
the ability to have an in-person hearing on the motion. However, Petitioner
does not indicate what he would have asked the Trooper at an in-person
hearing or what evidence may have been ferreted out had he been able to ask
the Trooper questions regarding the video, nor does he indicate how he was
prejudiced, if at all."
R. at p. 920.

The District Court forgets that Mr. Beyer's temporary permit and the stay regarding the
temporary permit for driving ended with the entry of the hearing officer's decision. R. at p. 17.
Without a hearing officer's decision and a decision on a motion to reconsider, there would have been
no stay in effect, and Mr. Beyer's driving privileges would have slipped away because there is no
opportunity to ask for a stay from the District Court. A request for a judicial review would have
been premature because of the motion to reconsider. Mr. Beyer was in a Catch-22 based on the
District Court's analysis regarding a motion for reconsideration. What good is it to ask the hearing
officer to reconsider something when there would be no stay in effect for the benefit of Mr. Beyer' s
property right, his driver's license and driving privileges?
In this case, the only information provided before the hearing was contained in the probable
cause affidavit. R. at p. 42. The information provided is one paragraph long. Clearly, having a
video of the entire contact with Mr. Beyer would have been immensely important for the preparation
of issues and preparation for examination of the arresting officer. Please note that after Mr. Beyer' s
Counsel received the video, he filed a Motion to Strike Breath Test. R. at p. 165. The video shows
all sorts of things that Counsel for Mr. Beyer would not have been aware off, but for the video.
Please remember that the arresting officer, Trooper Talbott, got to review the video before the
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hearing, but Counsel for Mr. Beyer did not. ALS T. at p. 11, 11. 17-20.
The District Court says that Petitioner has failed to show how he was prejudiced. A video
shows substantial information not available from any other source. Why have a due process hearing
when a driver is just shooting in the dark as to issues and facts. A proper subpoena was requested
in a timely fashion.
Counsel for Mr. Beyer was mistaken in thinking that simply getting the video after the
hearing would be productive and not prejudicial.
Hearing officers do not have to provide anything in any sort of timely, meaningful manner.
There is not one statute, one rule, no administrative code that protects the due process of a driver's
license. The hearing officers do not have to issue their decision in a timely fashion, and to top that
off, based on Johnson v. ITD, 2012 WL 1949853, there is absolutely no remedy that protects a driver
if a hearing officer never issues a ALS decision. There is no way to get any sort of stay from a
District Court judge on judicial review because the Court of Appeals has determined that there is no
subject matter jurisdiction without an ALS decision.
The Court can also review the ALS hearing transcript and note the lack of responsiveness
from the trooper. He was asked questions regarding the field sobriety tests and instead of simply
answering the questions, he was evasive. ALS T. at pp. 24-26, 34-35. The credibility of Trooper
Talbott is at issue based on Gibbar, and the line of cases from Alaska. See Midget v. Cook Inlet
Pretrial Facility, 53 P.3d 105, (Alaska 2002), Whitesides v. State, Department of Public Safety
Division of Motor Vehicles, 20 P.3d 1130, (Alaska 2001), all cited by the Gibbar court. Gibbar at
p. 949.
The court in Gibbar went through the issues of due process citing to the state and federal
cases regarding the process that this due and the important property right at issue, that being the
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driver's license. The court stated:
"Because the suspension of issued drivers' licenses involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees, drivers' licenses may not be
taken away without procedural due process. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105,
112, 97 S. Ct. 1723, 1727, 52 L. Ed.2d 172, 179-80 (1977), Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L. Ed.2d 90, 94-95 (1971), State
v. Ankney, 101 Id. L 3-4, 704 P.2d 333, 335-36 (1985)."
Gibbar at p. 945-946.
Three factors of procedural due process are noted in Gib bar citing to Matthews v. Eldridge3 ,
242 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976). See also Mackey v. Montrym, 43
U.S. 1, 10-19, 99 Sup. Ct. 2612, 2616-21, 61 L. Ed.2d 321, 329-35, (1979), Matter of McNeely, 119
Id. 182, 190-91, 804 P.2d 911,919-20 (Ct. App. 1990).
The Court can also note the Court of Appeal case, Bell v. Idaho Department of
Transportation, 151Idaho659, 262 P.3d. 1030 (2011). Bell specifically commented on the potential
lack of due process regarding the hearings and subpoenas issued by the hearing officers. In Mr.
Beyer's case, the information that was subpoenaed was not required to be provided until the day
of the hearing. Mr. Beyer did not get the subpoenaed information until after the hearing. In Smith

v. ITD, Nez Perce County Cause Number CV 2011-313, the subpoenas required information be
provided the day after the hearing. This lack of timely evidence was a grave disadvantage to Mr.
Beyer. In Besaw v. ITD, Nez Perce County Case Number CV 2011-00364, Supreme Court Case
#39759-2012, Mr. Besaw's attorney tried to play the video during the hearing which did not work

3

·'[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Gibbar at p. 946
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because the arresting officer could not hear the audio from Counsel's office through the phone
system to the officer's phone.
In-person hearings are of great importance in matters such as these ALS hearings. Credibility
of the witnesses was called into question in Mr. Beyer' s case. The Court should find that there is
was lack of due process and that Mr. Beyer's license suspension should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
The Court should remand this matter with an instruction to vacate the license suspension.
DATED this

day of August, 2012.
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